aaus-list @ ukrainianstudies.org -- [aaus-list] FW: [Rue] Research Update No. 282 (September 30, 2002):

[Taras Kuzio <t.kuzio@utoronto.ca>]

RESEARCH UPDATE
Vol. 8, No. 34/282 September 30, 2002
Copyright 2002 by UCIPR
Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research
(UCIPR)
All rights reserved.
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     Foreword to ³Iraqgate²
     
     Inna  Pidluska,  Europe  XXI  Foundation,  head   of
International Section, UCIPR
     
     The  surprise, promised by the Ukrainian  opposition
to President Leonid Kuchma, was delivered promptly though
did not arrive from the opposition. While five dozens  of
activists of the opposition forces insisted on a dialogue
with  Kuchma  in a rather unusual way ­ by  announcing  a
hunger strike in the building of his administration ­ the
U.S.  Administration announced it had decided to  suspend
assistance to the Ukrainian government and was  ready  to
start   adequate  action  in  connection   of   confirmed
possibility  that  Ukraine might have  been  involved  in
supplying air defense radars to Iraq. When U.S. President
Bush  is preparing to launch an attack on Iraq that  aims
at destroying the Saddam Hussein regime, such accusations
cannot   go  without  foreign  policy  implications   for
Ukraine.
     
     Domestic socio-political context
     Naturally,  Ukrainian  leadership  took  actions  to
refute  the  charges.  It was officially  announced  that
³Ukraine  is interested in the fastest open and objective
investigation  of  groundless  charges  of  violation  of
sanctions  of the UN Security Council, made against  it².
The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
published  information that Minister Anatoly  Zlenko  had
urgently  arrived to the UN headquarters in New York  and
stated  to  UN  Secretary General  Kofi  Anan  that  ³the
international  community  has no  grounds  whatsoever  to
accuse  Ukraine of violation of the sanctions of  the  UN
Security  Council, including on an issue as sensitive  as
supply  of arms to Iraq². On September 27 Anatoly  Zlenko
also  met acting head of the UN Security Council  Stephan
Tavrov, head of the UN Security Council in October Martin
Belinga-Ebutu,  head  of  the Committee  661  of  the  UN
Security  Council for sanctions on Iraq Ole Peter  Colby,
head  of  the  UN Commission for Monitoring, Control  and
Inspection   Hans   Blicks,   as   well   as    permanent
representatives of the five states ­ permanent members of
the UN Security Council at the UN. As the MFA site wrote,
³all   of   them  treated  with  understanding  Ukraine¹s
position  on  groundless  charges  made  against  it,  of
allegedly  having supplied the Kolchuga radar systems  to
Iraq,  and  highly appreciated our state¹s  readiness  to
cooperate   with  the  UN  Security  Council  and   other
interested parties in order to thoroughly and objectively
consider the aforementioned problem and find the  truth².
It  was  also  announced that ³the  Ukrainian  party  was
informed  that  in response to its request  the  Security
Council  intends  tomorrow,  on  September  28,  to  have
consultations  on the above issue. Secretary  General  of
the  Organization supported Kyiv¹s initiative for sending
independent experts of the UN to Ukraine for complete and
final  clarification  of the situation.²  Anatoly  Zlenko
also met NATO Secretary General George Robertson who  was
quoted earlier as stating that relations between NATO and
Ukraine  were going through a very difficult  period  and
demanded  ³answers  to  very serious  questions²  on  the
matter.
     Meanwhile,   it   was  impossible   to   limit   the
information to the diplomatic language only. Speaking  to
the  Associated  Press,  Minister  Zlenko  admitted  that
president Kuchma could have agreed to selling the  radars
to  Iraq,  but insisted that no operation that have  been
violation of the UN sanctions had been done, for  ³it  is
impossible to sell arms the way it is said there²  (i.e.,
on  the  tapes).  At  about the same  time  head  of  the
Ukrainian  Security Service Volodymyr Radchenko  admitted
in  an  interview to the Financial Times that  there  had
been discussions about possible sale of the Kolchugas  in
2000,  and the operation had been initiated by  a  ³high-
ranking  Ukrainian official², but the proposal  had  been
rejected.  That  person was head of the  ³Ukrspetsexport²
Valery  Malev, who had offered the plane one week  before
he  had  been  killed  in  a  car  crash.  The  ranks  of
³defenders  of  the international image² were  joined  by
secretary  of  the National Security and Defense  Council
Yevhen Marchuk, whose job made it unallowable for him  to
be  unaware of any possible action in the field  that  is
directly related to the current charges. So far not  much
enthusiasm was a response of the international  community
to Marchuk¹s pledge to ensure ³unprecedented openness² on
the  Kolchuga case, the declared readiness to demonstrate
to   international  experts  a  number  of  tactical  and
technical  features of the Kolchugas (though  ³obviously,
some things will remain secret²), and the promise to name
the  country that had purchased the Kolchugas as well  as
the intermediary firm that too part in the deal.
     
     Problems of Ukraine
     The  tapes, made by former presidential guard Mykola
Melnychenko,  that contain a recording of a  conversation
about  possible  sale of specific military  equipment  to
Iraq,  is  difficult to see as new ones: they were  first
published in the Internet about half a year ago. However,
today,  when  the  president and his men  are  struggling
vigorously  to  protect themselves from the  opposition¹s
attacks,  the  records have received a new  significance,
particularly when quoted by the U.S. Department of State.
The international community, that previously knew Ukraine
mainly   through  Chornobyl  and  the  murder  of  Georgy
Gongadze, received information that would suffice to make
Ukraine a pariah state in its eyes.
     It   is  hardly  possible  that  the  calls  of  the
opposition to the international community not to see  the
current political regime as identical to the country as a
whole  and  not to punish the country because  of  Kuchma
will  produce  the  desired result.  First,  an  ordinary
American or West European can hardly imagine the depth of
the growing gap between the state and the society. Hence,
in  their understanding the people that have elected such
a  government and have so far not resisted its actions in
an  active  and organized manner also deserves sanctions.
By  the way, according to a recent opinion poll conducted
by  the  Ukrainian  Center  for  Economic  and  Political
Studies  (the  Razumkov  Center),  57  percent  of  their
respondents are prepared to live in a totalitarian  state
that  has  high  standards  of living,  while  only  14.8
percent agree to live in a democracy with lower standards
of living.
     Ukraine¹s problems have been accumulating for a long
time.  They are a mixture of various factors that include
the crisis of confidence in the government at all levels,
particularly to the top leadership, as well as  the  lack
of  adequate societal and official reaction to  the  2000
³tapegate², the lack of political will on the part of the
government    to   make   necessary   conclusions,    and
pathological  inability  (or fear)  to  tell  the  truth.
Vigorous  denial of charges, not supported by  facts  and
clear answers to definite questions, give reasons for new
suspicion and accusations. President Kuchma, by the  way,
never  said  recently that his conversation  with  Malev,
proved by American experts to be true and currently  used
as  the  main supporting fact for the accusations against
Ukraine  ­  is not true. But it has also never been  said
what  WAS  true ­ and it is unlikely that  it  will  ever
become known.
     
     Problems of the U.S. and the International Context
     In ³peaceful time² Ukraine has not been something of
much  interest  to the contemporary political  Washington
D.C. Currently ­ and there is no much effort to hide that
­  there  is a chance to make some ³educational whipping²
so  that to show possible implications to other potential
offenders  of democratic values. Moreover,  the  ³war  on
terrorism² is currently probably the best way  to  secure
massive   public  support  for  actions   of   the   Bush
administration.  It  looks like having  pledged  a  ³fast
victorious  war²  on  terrorism, the U.S.  administration
have passed the point at which it could slow down or even
U-turn,  given  the  lack  of  substantial  international
support for the plans of the strike on Saddam.
     The   international  response  to  the   accusations
against Ukraine came almost immediately. A couple of days
later  one  of  the best-informed about the situation  in
Ukraine American experts, former Director for Ukraine  at
the  U.S.  national  Security Council John  Tedsrom  told
Radio  Liberty that the U.S. administration  had  decided
that  at  the  time  it  was  practically  impossible  to
cooperate with president Kuchma, for Kuchma had not  only
done  something wrong, but also lied about it.  The  next
day,  speaking  at  a  press  conference  in  Kyiv,  U.S.
Ambassador Carlos Pascual confirmed that the FBI  experts
had  concluded  that  the fragment of Melnychenko¹s  tape
with  the  dialogue about the Kolchugas was genuine,  but
clearly  stated  (and  de facto refuted  the  words  said
earlier by his deputy) that at present the United  States
do  not  have data that would prove the transfer  of  the
Kolchugas by Ukraine to Iraq. Diplomatically noting  that
the  USA  welcome  Ukraine¹s efforts aiming  at  thorough
investigation of this case, he added there was a need  to
form  a relevant body within the UN that would act  as  a
framework for an effective investigation. No details have
been  given  as to what sort of structure was  meant  and
what  the  results  of such an ³effective  investigation²
could be.
     Intergovernmental organizations and  alliances  also
are  not inclined to ignore the problem. Direct questions
are  supposed to be asked at the forthcoming  meeting  of
the  State  Secretaries  of  the  Ukrainian  Ministry  of
Foreign Affairs and the EC troika in Kyiv on October  11.
According  to the EC spokesperson, quoted by the  Deutche
Welle,  the U.S.¹s statement about possible sale of  arms
by  Ukraine to Iraq has not changed the position  of  the
European  Commission to Ukraine. On November 5 the  issue
will  be  discussed  again at the  EU-Ukraine  summit  in
Copenhagen.  Meanwhile, Secretary General of the  Council
of  Europe Walter Schwimmer announced that although  till
then  the Council of Europe had not received evidence  of
Ukraine¹s  violation of sanctions against  Iraq,  if  the
charges  are  proved as true the Council of Europe  ³will
have   to  take  that  into  account  in  relations  with
Ukraine², as ³the principles of the Council of Europe are
the same as the principles of the EU².
     It  is worth noting the reaction of Polish president
Aleksandr  Kwasniewski, a long-time special  intermediary
in  Kuchma¹s relations with the West. At a recent meeting
of  Defense  Ministers of NATO member states he  publicly
stated  Poland¹s  support  for the  U.S.  policy  towards
possible connections between the Ukrainian leadership and
Saddam  Hussein, and readiness to review Poland¹s  policy
towards Ukraine. Hence, Ukraine¹s hopes that Poland  will
be  its lobbyist for deepening relations with NATO at the
Prague  summit,  vanish. The Polish-Ukrainian  ³strategic
partnership²  that  has suffered serious  tests  recently
that have caused complaints and offence in certain Polish
circles,  to a large extent, depend to support  for  that
partnership by the USA.
     Russia¹s  silence is also noteworthy ­  particularly
compared  to  rather agitated discussion  in  Ukraine  of
possible  support for president Kuchma  that  Russia  can
promise  in  exchange  for  Ukraine¹s  accession  to  the
Eurasian  Economic  Union,  signing  an  agreement  about
forming  the  consortium for management of Ukraine¹s  gas
transportation   system,  or  extending   the   term   of
deployment  of  the Black Sea Fleet on the  territory  of
Ukraine. This ³quiet² policy of Russia suggests,  on  the
one hand, that it is not going to quarrel with the United
States because of Ukraine and that it is aware of its own
opportunity to benefit from the situation. At the  height
of  the  ³tapegate-1²  the meeting of  Russian  president
Vladimir   Putin   and   president   Leonid   Kuchma   in
Dnipropetrovsk  in  February 2001 resulted,  among  other
things,   in  limitation  of  Ukraine  foreign   economic
freedom.  Nowadays,  during  the  even  deeper  political
crisis,  Kuchma and Putin are going to meet in Zaporizhya
­  officially, to celebrate the 70th anniversary  of  the
famous  DniproGES power generating plant.  One  may  only
guess what the specific consequences of that meeting will
be.
     
     ³Yugoslav Scenario for Ukraine²?
     In  2000-2001,  the situation in Ukraine  was  often
compared to the situation in the former Yugoslavia,  when
the  West¹s  active  support helped the  substitution  of
hideous  Milosevic with little-known opposition.  Then  a
³Yugoslav  scenario² for Ukraine was seen  as  impossible
for  Ukraine  ­  not  lastly because  the  opposition  in
Ukraine  failed  to demonstrate that it  was  united,  to
produced a single leader, popular enough in the ³masses²,
to  show a program of change and commitment to taking the
power  and  responsibility that goes with it. This  time,
notwithstanding some significant change in the quality of
the  Ukrainian  opposition,  domestic  conditions  for  a
³Yugoslav scenario² are ­ so far ­ also missing. However,
international   circumstances   seem   to   present    an
opportunity  too tempting to miss. A couple of  days  ago
the   Ukrainska   Pravda  wrote  about   ³invitation   of
Yushchenko   incognito  to  Warsaw²,   which,   ³at   the
background  of  statements  of  spokesman  of  the  State
Department  <Š>  about  ³additional  proof  of  Ukraine¹s
involvement in supplying arms to Iraq², repeated in  Kyiv
by  deputy to the U.S. Ambassador <Š> is an open evidence
[that]  the  West wants to talk to Ukraine,  but  without
Kuchma².  A  ³Yugoslav scenario² was also mentioned.  The
analytical  weekly  ³Zerkalo  Nedeli²  also  conveyed   a
message to its intellectual-elitist audience: ³Washington
is  trying  to clearly demonstrate that it differentiates
for  itself [it] attitude to the President of Ukraine and
Ukraine as a country² (Zerkalo Nedeli, #37, September 28,
2002).  This  opinion  is  supported  by  the  fact  that
although the U.S. assistance for the Ukrainian government
has  been  suspended, other aid programs ­ for  instance,
those  aiming  at support of civil society  -  have  been
kept.   Yet,   there   is   no   guarantee   that    this
differentiation  will last forever and will  be  made  by
others.  There is a very strong chance that isolation  of
president Kuchma will transform into isolation of Ukraine
as  a  ³pariah  state², at least at the level  of  public
opinion abroad.
     
     Possible consequences for Ukraine
     The  U.S.  Administration will  be  inclined  to  be
satisfied with what it gathers through the ³unprecedented
openness², promised by Yevhen Marchuk, only as long as it
corresponds  with  the general plan  of  developments  in
which Ukraine, apparently, is expected to play a role  of
example to other potential abusers. Although so far there
is  no  reason to expect officially imposed international
sanctions on Ukraine, the cold de facto attitude, if  not
international isolation, of its leadership seems to be  a
rather realistic prospect.
     The  growing international scandal has an  important
domestic  dimension.  The timing of announcement  by  the
U.S.  Department of State that the tapes  containing  the
³Kolchuga  dialogue²  are  genuine,  the  fact  that  the
recognition  came now, during the actions  of  the  anti-
Kuchma   opposition,  not  only  makes  the  step  rather
controversial but also opens the chance for  the  radical
part   of   the  anti-Kuchma  opposition  (as  well   as,
indirectly,   for  other  interested  groups,   political
holdings  and  ³clans²)  to use it  for  their  political
purposes.  Those who argue that the American  accusations
not  just  coincided  in time with  the  actions  of  the
opposition,  but  were specially made to  strengthen  its
actions  and shake the chair under president Kuchma  tend
to   exaggerate  the  influence  and  prominence  of  the
Ukrainian  opposition  as well  as  the  significance  of
Ukraine as a whole for the United States. Meanwhile,  the
Ukrainian  president did give the U.S.  Administration  a
good  chance  to demonstrate the matter of principle  and
punish a suspected abuser and his country, if not for the
violation  itself, then for explicit readiness to  commit
it.  True,  in  a  democratic state  a  politician  whose
disreputable   intentions,  even  not  transformed   into
practice, become known to public, would hardly remain  in
his  position  for so long. Noteworthy, it is  the  first
time  that  the United States accuse Kuchma  exactly  for
giving approval to illegal actions of his subordinates.
     Notwithstanding  the controversy of  the  situation,
uncertainty of legal and moral aspects of using the taped
conversations of Ukrainian top officials as a proof,  the
scandal  that  is likely to escalate endangers  gains  of
Ukrainian  diplomacy and civil society  organizations  in
the  field  of  promoting  the idea  of  Ukraine¹s  Euro-
Atlantic   integration.  Here  are  a  few  most   likely
consequences  of  the  scandal,  not  matter   what   its
immediate outcome will be.
     First,   the   NATO   Prague  summit.   Unless   the
international controllers officially clear Ukraine of the
accusations  before  the  summit,  the  presence  of  the
Ukrainian  president at the summit in any  capacity  will
look  inadequate. Ukraine has been officially invited  to
participate,  and  it  is unlikely  that  there  will  be
efforts to disinvite her ­ for which agreement of the  19
member states would be needed. Another thing is what kind
of the involvement of the Ukrainian delegation that would
be,  what kind of meetings the president of Ukraine  will
have, etc.
     Second,  Ukraine may face, at least  for  a  certain
period  of time, unfavorable trade regimes that are  much
tougher than the anti-dumping investigations, CD disputes
or debates about the intellectual property rights.
     Third,  Ukraine¹s  dependence on Russia  will  grow.
While  Putin is unlikely to engage in overt confrontation
with The U.S. over Kuchma, he is likely to make an effort
to   ensure  as  much  control  over  Kyiv  as  possible.
Therefore,  there is a growing challenge  of  sustainable
dependence  of the Ukrainian establishment on  Russia  in
foreign as well as domestic issues.
     Forth, in order to restore Ukraine¹s image at  least
to  the  condition of it before the ³Iraqgate²  not  only
substantial effort will be needed, but also real reforms,
not the usual ³face-lifting². It will also be critical to
overcome the present-day ³personalization of politics².
     Presently Ukraine resembles a sick man that needs  a
surgery, as traditional pills and potions have failed  to
help. It is critical, though, that the ³surgery² is  done
professional, with proper instrument, and  based  on  the
fundamental principle: ³do not harm².

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