aaus-list @ ukrainianstudies.org -- [aaus-list] September 16: Political Chants

[Taras Kuzio <t.kuzio@utoronto.ca>]

--
RESEARCH UPDATE
Vol. 8, No. 33/281
September 23, 2002
Copyright 2002 by UCIPR
Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR)
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     September 16: Political Chants
     
     Yulia Tyshchenko, Head of Civil Society Programs
     
     The Overture
     A  revolution  can  be victorious  only  if  it  can
protect itself, a classic of Communism once stated. It is
hard  to answer for sure whether the September 16  events
in Ukraine were a revolution and what they could bring to
the organizers, and, most importantly, who managed to use
their  fruit. Less then 20 hours passed between the rally
in  the  Evropeiska  Square and the  destruction  of  the
protesters¹  tents near the presidential  administration.
64 protesters were detained by the police.
     The  Ukrainian opposition claims that the  September
16  events  were just the beginning, and more steps  will
follow that finally will bring down the regime. It  is  a
big   question  whether  such  claims  can  be  realized.
According   to  the  Constitution  (Article   108),   the
President¹s  powers  can be terminated  earlier  only  in
cases  of (1) resignation, (2) poor health that makes  it
impossible for the president to carry out his duties, (3)
impeachment, and (4) death. Currently there is no  reason
to  hope  that  Kuchma will respond to  the  opposition¹s
demands.  Efforts  to initiate the impeachment  procedure
through  the  parliament have failed, as  the  initiators
found themselves well short of the required 226 votes.
     On  September 16 the rally took place in the  center
of  Kyiv regardless of the judgment oft he Shevchenkivsky
borough court that had satisfied the lawsuit of the  Kyiv
State  Administration and ordered the opposition to  move
the venue of its rally 14 km away from Kyiv. According to
law-enforcement authorities, the rally was attended by 15
thousand  people. The organizers argue that  the  turnout
was  25,000  to 30,000. Throughout Ukraine,  the  protest
rallies gathered about 50,000 protesters, the police say,
while  Yulia  Tymoshenko  argues the  rally  participants
numbered 127,000. Hence, the opposition succeeded in  its
task  to bring as many people as possible to the streets.
Ironically,  people  throughout Ukraine  could  find  out
little  about  that from the media. The media,  in  their
turn,  managed  to  make very limited reports  about  the
event  and  use  optical tricks to make  sure  the  rally
looked less massive than it was.
     One  of  "expected  surprises" was  the  arrival  of
Viktor Yushchenko to the rally and his statement that the
authorities "understand only one kind of politics  -  the
one  done  under the carpet or behind the curtains"  and,
apparently, do not wish to engage in a dialogue with  the
opposition (Den, September 17, 2002). The participants of
the  rally adopted an appeal to the President of  Ukraine
that  called  on  his  to resign immediately.  They  also
called  on law-enforcement authorities not to follow  the
orders of Kuchma and foreign diplomats to ignore him. The
appeal,  signed  by  Yulia  Tymoshenko,  leader  of   the
Socialist  party Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the Communist
party  Petro  Symonenko, and Viktor Yushchenko  of  Nasha
Ukraina,  read that President Kuchma had no other  choice
that  to  confess his sins to the people  and  leave  the
office  immediately  (UNAIN,  September  16,  2002).  The
document  stated that within the years of  Kuchma¹s  one-
person  rule  the society and the state have been  thrown
back by 30 or 50 years, that Kuchma "became the president
illegally,  is involved in crime, and is responsible  for
the "catastrophic reduction of population of Ukraine".
     The opposition leaders failed to hand the appeal  to
Kuchma as they initially planned, as the President was in
Austria  on that day. The next day the President  refused
to  meet representatives of the protesters who wanted  to
hand  the appeal to him. According to presidential  chief
of staff Viktor Medvedchuk, Kuchma explained his decision
not  to  meet with the opposition representatives because
the  resolution of the rally was "humiliating"  for  him.
Meanwhile,  according  to Medvedchuk,  the  President  is
ready  for a dialogue with representatives of any  socio-
political  forces,  provided that would  be  a  civilized
exchange of opinions in which all of the participants are
concerned  primarily with the future of Ukraine.  In  his
view, the "extremely insolent nature of the appeal of the
participants  of  the  action"  makes  such  a   dialogue
impossible. The next day the opposition failed to  gather
enough  supporters  to  open an  urgent  session  of  the
parliament.
     Yushchenko¹s  signature under the tough  anti-Kuchma
appeal  was  a  surprise itself. A few  days  before  the
opposition   publication,  Silski  Visti,  published   an
article   titled   "The  Yushchenko  guys   support   the
opposition  with their hearts but do not  hurry  to  sign
under  that". On September 16 the signature was  publicly
placed  under the appeal. It is unclear whether the  fact
means that Nasha Ukraina finally positioned itself as  an
opposition force and whether the view was shared  by  all
members  of the faction. Part of the answer can be  found
in  a statement of Nasha Ukraina, issued on September 17:
the  "People¹s  Forum  "For  Democratic  Development   of
Ukraine!",  initiated  by Nasha Ukraina,  showed  to  the
society  and  the authorities a real chance to  exit  the
political  crisisŠ but the authorities did  not  use  the
chance  to sit to the negotiation table. "The authorities
stayed  deaf, blond and dumb," the statement read.  Nasha
Ukraina  demanded  to  release  the  protesters  detained
during the night of September 16 to 17, to call an urgent
session   of  the  parliament  to  discuss  the   current
situation  and  to hear reports of the  Ministry  of  the
Interior,  the  Ministry  of  Transport,  and  the  State
Committee   for   Information  and  Communications,   the
Ministry of Justice. The statement also demanded to  lift
media  censorship and provide access to the air  for  all
political  forces.  If the demands  were  not  satisfied,
Nasha Ukraina threatened to continue protest actions that
would  call  for early presidential elections  and  early
parliamentary elections based on a proportional  election
system.  The statement was, in fact, a reaction of  Nasha
Ukraina  to  the  lack of attention of  the  presidential
administration  to  their "traditional"  initiatives  for
forming  a parliamentary majority based on Nasha Ukraina,
and   forming  a  coalition  government.  As  if  sensing
possible reaction to the calls by Yushchenko, one of  the
group¹s  sympathizers, leader of the parliamentary  group
"Democratic  Initiatives" Stepan Hawrysh  announced  that
"the  authorities should not feel offended", as the  most
important  thing was for the authorities to refrain  from
ultimatums   and  demonstrate  responsibility   for   the
national  history. There is no certainty,  however,  that
the  appeal  to  "live in peace" will  be  heard  by  the
opposite side.
     
     Something about the reasons
     One may quote different reasons and motivations that
have  brought the people to the streets on September  16.
Most  of  the  reasons  can  be  classed  into  generally
political  and  personal ones. The personal  reasons  are
linked  to the leadership factor, as leading the  protest
action  makes  the leader a top actor in  the  opposition
circles   and  adds  to  his  or  her  chances  for   the
presidential elections - currently scheduled for the fall
of 2004. To a large extent, the "face" of the opposition,
its   actions  and  drawbacks  are  "programmed"  by  the
authorities.  The  point is not just  that  many  of  the
opposition  leaders were in power some time  ago.  It  is
difficult  to  single out criteria that  would  determine
belonging of some political forces to the opposition,  as
far  as  their  ideology,  clear  proposals  for  further
development  of  the  state and society,  strategies  are
concerned. Similarly, the government also does  not  seem
to  have  a  clear vision of what is it trying to  build,
regardless of declared strategic plans and slogans.
     To a large extent, the recent protest rally reflects
the  current  political  and informational  realities  in
which  the  Ukrainian opposition forces have to  operate.
The political environment includes the lack of mechanisms
of  influence in the parliament, the lack of  a  dialogue
with  the  government, and cases of pressure on the  MPs.
Hence, through appealing directly to voters and potential
supporters,   the  opposition  forces   are   trying   to
compensate  for the inability to legitimize their  claims
through   parliamentary  means.  By   generating   public
support,  the  opposition demonstrates its legitimacy  to
the   power-holders.  In  this  sense  the  actions   are
compensatory  in  nature  and  point  to  the   lack   of
democratic  mechanisms  of  political  dialogue  in  this
country.
     Another reason that is usually quoted by experts  is
the  lack  of  access  of the opposition  to  the  media.
Blocked from the media during the election campaign,  the
opposition  did  not get the access after the  elections.
The  announced  idea of formation of a media  holding  by
Nasha  Ukraina  so  far  has  not  been  implemented.  On
September   16,   all   TV   channels   were   down   for
"maintenance".  None  of national and  Kyiv  TV  channels
broadcast  before 3 pm, and the first newscasts  appeared
only in the evening.
     
     "Building   a  majority":  moving  in  a   political
labyrinth
     One of the reasons that forced Nasha Ukraina towards
the  opposition  slogans was the process  of  building  a
majority  in  the  Ukrainian parliament  -  closed,  non-
transparent and personality motivated as ever.
     The  current  stage  of  shaping  the  parliamentary
majority  was launched by the president¹s declaration  of
the  need  for transition to a parliamentary-presidential
republic.  Noteworthy, there were little, if  any,  talks
about  what  should  be done first -  amendments  to  the
Constitution  prepared and introduced or  a  specific  de
facto  majority formed first, and a government formed  on
its  basis. The supreme task of political forces  outside
the    parliament,    namely,   in    the    presidential
administration, is to build a majority that would form  a
coalition  government reflecting interests and  ambitions
of consolidating forces of such a majority.
     Paradoxically, nowadays there is no real majority in
the  Ukrainian parliament, though a number of options are
being  discussed. Obviously, it is impossible to  form  a
majority  based on the opposition four. Even  though  all
MPs that are members of the Yulia Tymoshenko¹s block, the
Socialist  faction,  the  Communist  faction  and   Nasha
Ukraina  are  taken together (regardless of their  strong
differences and strategies), that would make no more than
217 votes. Moreover, those factions are also not monolith
-  take,  for instance, the position of Crimean Communist
leader Leonid Grach and his friendly relations with  pro-
presidential factions. The Communists still do not have a
clear  position  regarding the appeal of  the  Prosecutor
General  to  the parliament to strip Yulia Tymoshenko  of
her  immunity  to  prosecution and allow  her  arrest  on
economic criminal charges. The majority based on the four
factions could not be formed during the election  of  the
Speaker.  It  is unlikely that the project might  succeed
today.
     There are efforts to form the majority based on nine
pro-presidential factions, with or without Nasha Ukraina.
Such  a  majority will give from 216 to 223 MPs and  will
also  be  very  unstable and vulnerable to pressures  and
hazards. Moreover, it will not be able to carry  out  the
fundamental changes announced by President Kuchma.  While
it  is  true that some members of the opposition factions
can  be recruited to such a majority, so far negotiations
have not been completed.
     Another  option is forming a majority of eight  pro-
presidential  factions less SDPU(o) plus  Nasha  Ukraina.
Yet,  given  the  influence of Viktor Medvedchuk  in  the
parliament,  and the careful attitude of pro-presidential
factions, this option is not very likely.
     Another option would be a majority formed of  almost
320  MPs  -  including members of Nasha Ukraina  and  the
SDPU(o) factions. This is the most favored option of most
of  pro-presidential factions. The difficulty of  such  a
solution  is  personal  political  confrontation  between
Yushchenko  and  Medvedchuk that makes  even  a  tactical
alliance between them unlikely. The two politicians  keep
challenging  each  other by trying to  form  "their  own"
majority and, therefore, influence the formation  of  the
future Cabinet of Ministers and gain additional scores in
terms    of    the   presidential   election   prospects.
Paradoxically, the same factions are prepared to build  a
majority with Yushchenko and with Medvedchuk.
     The process of building a majority looks like moving
in  a  political labyrinth with no certainty as to  where
any  of the ways leads and strong chances to get lost.  A
step  towards  forming a majority was made at  the  Forum
"For  Democratic  Development of Ukraine",  organized  by
Nasha  Ukraina.  On  September 15 some  political  forces
represented  in  the parliament - Yushchenko,  leader  of
Trudova   Ukraina  -  PPU  Serhiy  Tihipko,   leader   of
Democratic  Initiatives  Stepan Hawrysh,  leader  of  the
Agrarians Kateryna Vashchuk and leader of the faction  of
the  People¹s  Democratic  Party  Anatoly  Tolstoukhov  -
signed  a Joint Statement declaring their initiative  for
forming  a  democracy coalition in the parliament.  Later
on,  one of the most active advocates of including  Nasha
Ukraina to the majority, Sergiy Tihipko, announced he had
spoken  by  telephone to leader of  the  faction  of  the
Regions  of  Ukraine  Raisa Bohatyriova  who  had  voiced
support for the idea and the intention to sign the  Joint
Statement  in the near future. On September 18, political
coordinator of Nasha Ukraina Roman Bezsmertnyi  confirmed
that  Nasha  Ukraina  was  interested  in  "contact   and
approximation" with the Donetsk group, represented by the
Regions  of  Ukraine  (Ukrainska  Pravda,  September  18,
2002).
     The  number of volunteers to join the Nasha Ukraina-
based   alliance  appeared  to  grow.  Recently,   Viktor
Yushchenko   announced  that  the   Narodovladdya   group
intended  to join the alliance and was prepared  to  sign
the  necessary  documents. However, some uncertainty  did
not disappear. For instance, although the PDP was one  of
the  signatories of the Joint Statement, on September  20
the  leader of the faction Valery Pustovoitenko announced
there  were  several options of forming  a  majority.  He
argued  the team for the majority should be based on  all
parliamentary factions and groups and include  "everybody
who  wants  to work; that may be Nasha Ukraina as  well".
The  interpretation  of  Nasha Ukraina  as  just  one  of
"involved" members instead of the basis for the  majority
changes   the  nature  of  the  would-be  alliance   and,
obviously, does not suit Nasha Ukraina. The statement  of
the  PDP  faction leader was a reaction to the  claim  of
Tihipko  that  the "basis for the parliamentary  majority
will be the factions that signed the Statement on forming
a  majority at the Forum of democratic forces in Kyiv  on
September  15".  Furthermore,  Raisa  Bohatyriova,   who,
reportedly,  intended  to join the  initiative  of  Nasha
Ukraina,  announced that negotiations about the  would-be
majority  were  taking place in two formats:  "nine  pro-
presidential factions plus Nasha Ukraina" and "nine  pro-
presidential factions without Nasha Ukraina".
     Viktor Yushchenko also spoke about separate options.
On  September 20 he announced there were two  centers  of
forming a parliamentary majority - one of them formed  in
the  presidential  administration  where,  according   to
Yushchenko, there are daily reports that "the  collective
farm  will be built at any conditions, with all  possible
mechanisms"; and the other one, formed in the parliament,
"in  the  hands of democratic forces", aware of the  fact
that   "Ukraine   no  longer  accepts  an  administrative
majority".
     Viktor  Medvedchuk  does not remain  silent  on  the
matter.  On  September 20 the SDPU(o)  faction  issued  a
statement  that  it  considered  impossible  to  join   a
majority  together with Nasha Ukraina  until  its  leader
publicly calls off his signature under the resolution  of
the protest rally, "Rise, Ukraine!", for "those texts are
extremely  humiliating  in  form  and  not  only  contain
groundless  accusations against the  government  and  the
incumbent  President,  but also represent  disrespect  to
authority of the Ukrainian state".
     It  is  hard to count the number of discussions  and
consultations  in the office of Speaker Volodymyr  Lytvyn
about formation of the "9 + NU" and "9 - NU" options.  It
is  similarly difficult to say how many consultations and
meetings    have   been   held   in   the    presidential
administration. Viktor Medvedchuk, who is  not  going  to
lose  his influence on the legislature commented  on  the
initiative  of  the  five factions  that  had  signed  an
agreement  at  the Democracy Forum, by  saying  that  the
majority  should  be formed around the  political  report
announced  by the President on August 24. A parliamentary
majority  should be formed in the session  hall,  not  at
research  conferences, Medvedchuk added. Anyway,  we  may
see   the   reasons   that  pushed   Nasha   Ukraina   to
participation in the actions. On September 18, 2002, NU¹s
political  coordinator Roman Bezsmertnyi said that  Nasha
Ukraina  would not only participate in the protests,  but
would  also  acts as their organizer "if  the  government
refuses to start a dialogue with the society".
     It  is  hard to say if the political forces  in  the
parliament  manage to decide on the majority  within  the
short   term,   as   announced.  On   September   19,   a
representative of Nasha Ukraina Yuri Kostenko and  leader
of  Trudova Ukraina/PPU faction Serhiy Tihipko  announced
they had agreed on a draft coalition agreement that would
have to be approved by the Speaker and the President.  By
September  20 the President found no time in hi  schedule
to  see Kostenko and Tihipko. His reluctance casts doubts
about  implementation of the "9+1"  or  the  "8  +  Nasha
Ukraina" scenarios. It looks like in this play, in  which
many  of  the  actors  play  several  roles  at  a  time,
everybody  wants  to  keep  the  pause  for  as  long  as
possible.   Meanwhile,  the  politics  continues   moving
through a labyrinth.

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